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PETRELLA V. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER, INC.
695 F.3D 946 (9TH CIR. 2012)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Petrella v. Metro-Goldvyn-Mayer, Inc., Paula Petrella
("Petrella") appealed a grant of summary judgment against her
copyright infringement claim related to two screenplays and a
book that formed the basis for the 1980 film "Raging Bull."'
Petrella sought relief for damages incurred during the three-year
statute of limitations period from 2006 to 2009, and also injunctive
relief for any future acts of infringement.2 The federal court
decided that these claims were barred by the defense of laches,
which prevents a plaintiff who "with full knowledge of the facts,
acquiesces in a transaction and sleeps on his rights."'
When the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Stewart v. Abend in 1991, Petrella was able to
successfully renew her father's copyright interest in the
screenplay, which he helped author with boxer Jake LaMotta.4
Petrella waited 18 years after this renewal to sue the defendant
film production company Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. ("MGM")
for copyright infringement.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant defendant
MGM's motion for summary judgment.6
II. BACKGROUND
Beginning in 1976, Frank Peter Petrella, father of the appellant,
1. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir.
2012).
2. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 2013 WL 6141396, 30 (Nov. 15,
2013).
3. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 951 (citing Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d
942, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
5. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 952.
6. Id. at 951.
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and Jake LaMotta assigned to Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc.
their copyright interests in two screenplays and a book about
LaMotta's life as a professional boxer.' While it is disputed which
of these three was actually authored first, the United States
Copyright Office registered the following: a screenplay in 1963,
which lists Frank Petrella as the sole author and claimant with a
collaboration reference on the title page to Jake LaMotta; a book in
1970, which lists Petrella, LaMotta, and Joseph Carter as co-
authors; and another screenplay in 1973 listing Petrella as the sole
author.' All three copyrights were for a term of 28 years.' Then in
1978, Chartoff-Winkler sold the movie rights to United Artists, a
subsidiary of MGM, which in turn registered a copyright for a new
film, Raging Bull in 1980.'o
The movie Raging Bull, starring Robert De Niro and directed by
Martin Scorsese, was released in late December 1980." The
biographical film paints a less than flattering picture of LaMotta's
life but was critically a big success, winning two Academy Awards
(including Best Actor for De Niro's portrayal of LaMotta) and
getting nominated for six others.12 The movie did not do as well at
the box office, generating only $23 million domestically on a
budget of $18 million." Shortly after the release of the film in
1981, Frank Petrella died and the interest in the screenplays and
book passed to his daughter Paula.'4
Not until 1990, when the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Abend, did Paula, Frank Petrella's daughter, have an
opportunity to renew her father's copyright interest in the 1963
7. Id. at 950.
8. Id. at 949.
9. Id. at 950.
10. Id.
11. RAGING BULL (United Artists 1980), available at
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0081398.
12. Id. Raging Bull follows the story of "an emotionally self-destructive
boxer's journey through life, as the violence and temper that leads him to the top
in the ring, destroys his life outside it." Id. The film won two Academy Awards,
including Best Actor in a Leading Role for Robert DeNiro's portrayal of
LaMotta. Id.
13. Id
14. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 950.
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screenplay. 5  In Abend, the Supreme Court held that when an
author dies during the life of the original copyright and before
getting a chance to renew, the author's statutory successors are
entitled to renewal rights even when the author has previously
assigned the rights to another party." Paula immediately acquired
representation to assist her in filing for a renewal of her rights to
the 1963 screenplay."
In 1998, seven years after the Abend decision, Petrella's lawyer
contacted MGM stating that Petrella's rights in the screenplay had
been renewed and that Raging Bull, as a derivative work, infringed
her rights." Although the derivative work was prepared lawfully
under the terms of the original assignment, once the assignor's heir
revokes those rights, the work cannot continue to be exploited
without a new assignment.' 9 Petrella's counsel sent MGM several
cease and desist letters between 1998 and 2000.20 After a final
letter on April 5, 2000, Petrella went silent until the filing of the
lawsuit at issue in this case in 2009.21
III. THE DEFENSE OF LACHES
MGM secured a summary judgment motion in district court,
arguing that Petrella's claim was barred by the equitable defense
of laches.22 A successful laches defense requires that the defendant
show that the plaintiff delayed in initiating the lawsuit, that the
delay was unreasonable, and that the delay resulted in prejudice to
the defendant.2 3 On appeal, Petrella argued that the long filing
delay (18 years) was reasonable because of her mother and
15. Id.
16. Abend, 495 U.S. at 219.
17. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 950.
18. Id.
19. Abend, 495 U.S. at 221. ("Therefore, if the author dies before the
renewal period, then the assignee may continue to use the original work only if
the author's successor transfers the renewal rights to the assignee.").
20. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 2013 WL 6141396, 57 (Nov.
15, 2013).
21. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 952.
22. Id. at 951.
23. Id. at 951-52.
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brother's health problems and the fear of retaliation from MGM.24
Petrella also argued that the delay did not prejudice MGM because
they reaped a large profit from the movie during the delay.25 It
was undisputed that Petrella was aware of her potential claims
since 1991 and that the 18 years that elapsed constituted a delay
for the purposes of the first element of the laches defense.26
A. Reasonableness of the Delay
A delay is reasonable in a copyright suit "when it is necessitated
by the exhaustion of remedies . . . when it is used to evaluate and
prepare a complicated claim and when its purpose is to determine
whether the scope of the proposed infringement justifies the cost
of litigation."27 Delay is not reasonable "when the purpose is to
capitalize on the alleged infringer's labor, by determining whether
the infringer's conduct will be profitable."28
In determining the reasonableness of Petrella's delay, the court
split the delay into two parts: the first from 1991, when Petrella
discovered her renewal rights, to 1998 when her lawyer contacted
MGM, and the second from 1998 to 2009 when Petrella finally
filed her lawsuit.29 As to the first part from 1991 to 1998, Petrella
revealed through her testimony that the reason she did not make
the defendants aware of her claims was because the film was "in
the red and would probably never recoup," and because she didn't
realize there was a time limit on filing a claim.30 As to the second
part from 1998 to 2009, Petrella gave three reasons for not filing a
claim including (1) her brother's disability and her mother's
illness, (2) her mother's fear of retaliation from MGM, and (3) her
family's inability to afford a lawsuit. 3 1
24. Id.
25. Id at 952.
26. Id. ("As the district court found, it is '[u]ndisputed that [Petrella] was
aware of her potential claims (as was MGM) since 1991.").
27. Id.
28. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 952.
29. Id. "There are two relevant periods of delay . .
30. Id.
3 1. Id.
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The court determined that her brother and mother's health
situation was an inadequate explanation for an 18-year delay.3 2
She was clearly consulting with attorneys regarding her renewal
rights during this period." The court also noted that in general,
inability to afford a lawsuit does not make a long delay
reasonable.34
Ultimately, the court determined that the real reason Petrella
filed the claim so late was that "the film hadn't made any
money."35 The court construed Petrella's conduct as unreasonable
because she was trying to capitalize on the labor of the infringer
and waiting to see if MGM's conduct would be profitable before
filing suit.36 Therefore, the court found the plaintiffs conduct
constituted an unreasonable delay."
B. Prejudice
Laches requires a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by
the plaintiffs unreasonable delay.38 The longer the delay, the
more likely it is that a court will find prejudice." There are two
relevant categories of prejudice: expectations-based prejudice and
evidentiary prejudice.40 Expectations-based prejudice occurs when
a defendant suffers consequences that would not have occurred
had the suit been filed in a timely manner.4' Evidentiary prejudice
occurs when necessary physical evidence or witness testimony is
lost to time.4 2  The court found that the defendants suffered
expectations-based prejudice.43 Therefore, the court did not need
to address evidentiary prejudice.44
32. Id. at 952-53.
33. Id at 953.
34. Id.
35. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 953.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 953.
42. Id.
43. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 953.
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To demonstrate expectations-based prejudice the defendant must
show that during the delay he invested money to expand the
business or entered into other business transactions based on the
belief that he owned a valid copyright.45 Prejudice may exist if a
defendant entered into business transactions or incurred liability
for damages because of a belief of presumed rights.46
The court found that there was sufficient evidence that the delay
was prejudicial to MGM because of the money, time, and effort
invested in the movie for 18 years.47 Since 1991, MGM had
distributed and marketed Raging Bull extensively in the United
States and abroad, resulting in an estimated cost to MGM of
approximately $8.5 million dollars in the United States alone.48
Additionally, the defendants spent $3 million to distribute the 25th
anniversary DVD edition of the movie and incurred $100,000 in
costs to convert the original film to Blu-Ray format.4 9 Defendants
also entered into television licensing contracts with television
companies, some of which would not expire until 2015, creating
potential future liability." If Ms. Petrella had timely filed suit in
either 1991 or 1998, MGM would have been able to litigate the
matter and save themselves significant expenses."
Finally, the court compares the case to Jackson v. Axton, where
a defendant successfully proved expectations-based prejudice for
use of the song "Joy to the World."5 2 The defendant in the case
"arranged his business affairs around the Song, promoted the Song
The two primary forms of prejudice in the laches context are expectations based
prejudice, which exists where a defendant 'took actions or suffered
consequences that it would not have, had the plaintiff brought suit promptly;'
and evidentiary prejudice, which exists where there are 'such things as lost,
stale, or degraded evidence, or witnesses whose memories have faded or who
have died.'
Id. (quoting Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 955) (emphasis in original).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 953-54.
49. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 953.
50. Id. at 954.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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as his own, licensed the Song many times to third parties, and sold
the Song . . . . [N]umerous business transactions ha[d] been made
in reliance on [the defendant's] sole ownership of the Song."53
This evidence was sufficient for a finding of prejudice.54
1. Grand Canyon Trust v. Tucson Electric Power Co. Comparison
The court was careful to distinguish Jackson and the case at bar
from a Ninth Circuit decision, Grand Canyon Trust v. Tucson
Electric Power Co., where the court denied a laches defense for
lack of expectations based prejudice." The case involved the
validity of a building permit after the 1977 enactment of the Clean
Air Act.56 An environmental non-profit organization, Grand
Canyon Trust, sued a power company, Tucson Electric, nearly 20
years after the power company had constructed two coal-powered
generators whose permits were in violation of the Clean Air Act. 7
Tucson Electric argued that replacing the generators would cost
$300 million and that they suffered expectations based prejudice."
However, the court found that the delay permitted Tucson to
operate the two generators in violation of the law for over 20
years, allowing the company to reap a significant profit.59
In the case at hand, MGM was making money as a result of
independent business decisions based on the belief that they owned
a valid copyright.60 Even if the court found that MGM infringed
Petrella's copyright, the profits that are attributable to MGM's
promotion and distribution of the film will wind up in Petrella's
pocket.' The court concluded that this type of situation is "the
essence of expectations based prejudice."6 2 In contrast, Tucson
53. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889-90 (9th Cir. 1994)).
54. Id.
55. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 955; see generally Grand Canyon Trust v. Tucson
Electric Power Co., 391 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004).
56. Grand Canyon Trust, 391 F.3d at 982.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 988.
59. Id. at 988-89.
60. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 955.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Electric finished building its two generators in 1985 and 1990 and
was able to continue operating them because the suit was delayed
until 2004.63 If the suit had been brought before 1990 there might
have been expectations based prejudice because Tucson Electric
would have spent $300 million on two new generators that had not
made any money.' Instead, Tucson profited from the delay for 20
years. Therefore, Tucson Electric, unlike MGM, did not suffer
expectations based prejudice."
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND ACCOUNTING
Petrella also brought claims for unjust enrichment and
accounting.67 She argued that had the defendants been co-owners
instead of infringers, they would have owed an ongoing duty to
pay Petrella any money that was derived through exploiting the
screenplay and its derivatives.6' The court ruled that because
unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy and laches is an
equitable defense, laches also bars her unjust enrichment claim.69
V. SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
After the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, defendants sought sanctions and attorney's fees
against Petrella." The court found that the district court's denial
of both m6ffons was not an abuse of discretion.7 '
Rule 11 sanctions are applied when a filing is frivolous, legally
unreasonable, without factual foundation, or brought for an
improper purpose. 72 It is not a violation of Rule 11 if an attorney
63. Grand Canyon Trust, 391 F.3d at 988-89.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 956.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 956.
71. Id. at 957.
72. Id. (citing Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir.
1996)).
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files suit where there is an applicable affirmative defense, so long
as there is a colorable argument against the affirmative defense.
Petrella had a colorable argument because laches is an equitable
defense with several parts, and she thought that she could prevail
on at least one of the factors.74 Also, the case was less clear than
other decisions in the past that involved laches." The appellate
court agreed with the district court that denial of sanctions was
appropriate."
Under § 505 of the Copyright Act, a district court has broad
discretion in determining whether to assign opposing party's
attorney's fees in a particular case." To overcome the district's
court decision to deny attorney's fees, there must have been an
inaccurate view of the law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact."
Because Petrella's claims were barred by laches, and not because
of the inadequacy of her copyright claims, the district court
believed that it would be inappropriate to impose attorney's fees
on Petrella." In addition, the court offered a policy argument that
awarding attorney's fees would deter future copyright holders that
might have valid copyright claims." The evidence otherwise
shows no improper motive by Petrella, and the appellate court
affirmed the denial of attorney's fees as well."
VI. CONCURRENCE
The concurrence agreed that the majority "faithfully applie[d]"
the doctrine of laches under Ninth Circuit law, but disagreed that
laches should be an option for potential copyright infringers.82
Judge Fletcher noted that the Ninth Circuit "is the most hostile to
73. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 957.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2014).
78. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 957 (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517
(1994)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 958.
513
9
Zitnik: Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. 695 F.3D 946 (9TH CIR. 2012
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXIV:505
copyright owners of all the circuits."" In the Fourth Circuit,
laches is not available as a defense at all; in the Eleventh Circuit
there is a strong presumption that a plaintiffs suit is timely if it is
filed before the statute of limitations; and in the Sixth Circuit,
laches is available only under extraordinary circumstances.8 4
The concurrence pointed out that the laches defense for
copyrights is not provided for in the original 1909 Copyright Act. 5
It is "entirely a judicial creation."86 Judge Learned Hand's opinion
in Haas v. Leo Feist Inc., in particular, is used by the majority to
justify the application of laches:
If the defendant be a deliberate pirate, [a prejudice
determination] might be irrelevant . . .; but it is no
answer to such inequitable conduct, if the defendant
Feist is innocent, to say that its innocence alone will
not protect it. It is not [the infringer's] innocence,
but the plaintiffs availing himself of that innocence
to build up a success at no risk of his own, which a
court of equity should regard."
Judge Fletcher pointed out that this quote is actually describing
equitable estoppel, not laches." The difference between laches
and estoppel in copyright cases is that laches is actually less
demanding for the infringer to prove." Laches is allowed for any
infringer so long as he is not a "willful infringer" and has invested
money in the copyright, whether he makes a profit based on the
delay or not." The defendant also needs to prove that the plaintiff
had constructive knowledge of the infringement, as opposed to
actual knowledge.91
83. Id.
84. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 958.
8 5. Id.
8 6. Id.
87. Id. at 959 (quoting Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108
(S.D.N.Y. 1916)).
88. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 959.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Judge Fletcher distinguished laches and estoppel to show that
the laches defense works to the detriment of valid copyright
holders.92 He closes the argument by warning that the court should
provide better protection to copyright holders with valid
infringement claims, like Petrella, who filed suit only for damages
within the applicable three-year statute of limitations.93 This
requires a re-examination of the difference between equitable
estoppel and laches and when the defenses may be appropriately
used.94
VII. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The issue that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court is
whether laches can be applied without restriction in copyright
infringement cases. Technically, Petrella filed timely within the
statute of limitations because she seeks damages for the period
from 2006 to 2009.95 Laches however, operates as a total bar to
both her claim for damages and her claim for injunctive relief, and
this fundamentally affects Petrella's substantive right to renew her
father's copyright and take action against infringers.9 6
Laches gives a tactical advantage to the infringer and
disadvantages the copyright holder, as Fletcher's concurrence
suggests.97 In future cases, courts may dismiss an infringement
claim that has caused "harm" to the infringer through the delay,
even if the delay is only two or three days removed from the three
year limitations period." In cases where laches is used, Courts
92. Id. at 958. The court explained that "[o]ur circuit is the most hostile to
copyright owners of all the circuits." Id.
93. Id. at 959.
94. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 959. "We should revisit our case law to provide
appropriate protection to innocent copyright owners who have brought
infringement suits within the statute of limitations. A recognition of the
distinction between equitable estoppel and laches would be a good place to
start." Id.
95. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc., 2014 WL 221232 (2014) (No. 12-1315).
96. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 95, at 9.
97. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 958.
98. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 95, at 39.
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will focus their analysis entirely on the delay, and dismiss cases
without analyzing the actual infringement itself. This problem is
compounded by the fact that infringer's only need to prove that the
copyright holder had constructive as opposed to actual knowledge
of the infringement. This means that there is a lower evidentiary
threshold for proving that the copyright holder was intentionally
delaying its lawsuit.
The Ninth Circuit in Petrella does not clearly define what would
be a reasonable excuse for delay, thus further disadvantaging the
copyright holder. Delay is both permissible if used "to determine
whether the scope of the proposed infringement will justify the
cost of litigation," and not permissible when used to capitalize "on
the value of the alleged infringer's labor, by determining whether
the infringing conduct will be profitable."9 9 The court is trying to
distinguish between copyright holders that are waiting in the wings
for their targeted infringer to make money and holders that are
doing an honest calculation of whether the claim is worth suing
for. This will be a difficult determination for courts to make and,
more importantly, will make it harder for copyright holders
looking to prove the legitimacy of their delay.
In Petrella's case, she admitted to waiting to sue because "the
film hadn't made money" and that excuse is not reasonable and
clearly prejudices the defendant.'o However, future cases may
provide less guidance in determining the copyright owner's
intentions. Inquiry into the intention of the copyright holder is not
only difficult, but it detracts from the true purpose of a copyright
claim: to stop unreasonable use of a copyright holder's intellectual
property. The threshold for dismissing a claim of copyright
infringement should be higher, and perhaps laches should be
eliminated as a defense for copyright infringement altogether.
Laches has been used sparingly, if at all, in other jurisdictions to
dismiss copyright infringement actions. As Judge Fletcher points
out, in the Fourth Circuit, laches is not available as a defense
against copyright infringement at all."' Estoppel, "the equitable
99. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 953 (quoting Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954-55)
(emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Petrella, 695 F.3d at 958.
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cousin" of laches, has a higher standard of proof but serves the
same end as laches.'O2  Innocent infringers looking to dismiss
frivolous claims against their works could look to estoppel as a
suitable alternative to laches.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Petrella v. MGM held that Petrella's copyright infringement
claim for the screenplay "Raging Bull" was barred by laches.'o3
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, MGM.'04 The 18 year delay
by the plaintiff unreasonably prejudiced the defendant, who had
marketed and licensed "Raging Bull" extensively during those 18
years.' 5 This holding may disadvantage copyright holders in the
Ninth Circuit. Infringers that use the laches defense will focus the
court's attention on the delay, not the substance, of the copyright
infringement claim. The Supreme Court should clarify if such a
doctrine should be an option for infringers faced with a copyright
infringement suit.
Robert Zitnik*
102. Id. at 959.
103. Id. at 956.
104. Id. at 957.
105. Id. at 953-54.
* J.D. Candidate 2015, DePaul University College of Law; B.A. 2010,
University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Professor Livingston
for helping me review my article.
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